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I. Introduction
"Better that ten guilty men escape, than that one innocent suffer."1

In 1981 Julius Ruffin was found guilty of rape and sodomy in a
Virginia court.2 A white female nursing student was the victim of a rape,
and Ruffin, an African-American male, worked at the same Virginia
Hospital as the victim.3 At trial, the victim testified she was certain that
Ruffin was the perpetrator.4 Ruffin’s girlfriend testified he was with her the
night in question, but the scientific testing performed on the semen sample
displayed a high probability that Ruffin was a match.5 Despite Ruffin’s
proclamations of his innocence and an alibi witness, after two hung jury
trials Ruffin was sentenced to life in prison.6 In 2003, DNA testing

1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 289 (William
Draper Lewis ed., The Lawbook Exchange 2008) (1795).
2. The Innocence Project, Know the Cases on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations:
Profile of Julius Ruffin, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/250.php (last visited Mar.
23, 2011) (describing the case profile on Julius Ruffin out of Virginia) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also The Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project, Case
Profile on Julius Ruffin, http://www.exonerate.org/case-profiles/julius-ruffin/ (last visited
Mar. 23, 2011) (providing a detailed description of Julius Ruffin’s story and the events
leading up to his wrongful incarceration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
3. See supra note 2 (describing the wrongful conviction and exoneration of Julius
Ruffin).
4. The victim was attacked at her apartment. Weeks later she saw Ruffin walking
onto an elevator in the Medical School where she was a nurse and Ruffin was a maintenance
worker. She immediately called the police and identified Ruffin as her assailant. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.

THROUGH THE LENS OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE RULE 403

767

exonerated Ruffin.7 An innocent man spent twenty-one years in prison
based almost entirely on one erroneous eyewitness identification.8
"[T]here is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being
who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the
one!’"9 Over the last twenty years, researchers have made significant
scientific advances that bring to light the reliability problems inherent in
eyewitness identifications.10 This research reveals that many of the factors
affecting eyewitness identification reliability are counterintuitive and many
jurors’ assumptions about how memories are created are actively wrong.11
One study estimated that half of all wrongful convictions result from false
identifications.12 Despite this, jurors often find eyewitness testimony very
convincing and most believe that it is reliable.13
However, Federal Evidence Rule 40314 grants federal judges wide
discretionary power to exclude eyewitness identification expert testimony
highlighting these reliability issues. It is thus important to examine the
purpose and language of the federal rule that judges are using to block this
now well-established body of research from coming into our nation’s
7. Id.
8. Id. ("Not only was Ruffin excluded, but another incarcerated man, in prison for
rape, was linked to the sample.").
9. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)).
10. The Supreme Court has held that identifications which occur under questionable
circumstances should not be admitted at trial. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114
(1977) ("[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification
testimony. . . ."). "[T]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of
criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification." Id. at 119 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967)).
11. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that
"factors bearing on eyewitness identifications may be known only to jurors, or may be
imperfectly understood by many, or may be contrary to the intuitive beliefs of most"
(quoting People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 720 (Cal. 1984))).
12. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 241, 243 (1986).
13. PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 19 (1965);
see also Watkins, 449 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[M]uch eyewitness
identification evidence has a powerful impact on juries. Juries seem most receptive to, and
not inclined to discredit, testimony of a witness who states that he saw the defendant commit
the crime."); Manson, 432 U.S. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[J]uries unfortunately are
often unduly receptive to [identification] evidence . . . .").
14. FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.").
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courtrooms. Is Federal Evidence Rule 403 being used as a weapon against
the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony?
This Note will begin by briefly summarizing the recent scientific
findings in the area of eyewitness identification.15 This overview will focus
principally on the counterintuitive weak correlation between eyewitness
confidence and accuracy.16 Additionally, the eyewitness identification
section will conclusively demonstrate that the "alternatives" to eyewitness
identification expert testimony are unacceptable and ineffective.17 An
analysis of the purpose and history behind Federal Evidence Rule 40318 will
then set the stage for an in-depth examination of the current federal circuit
court split regarding the admission of eyewitness identification expert
testimony.19 This Note divides the current treatment of eyewitness expert
testimony in the federal circuit courts into three categories: the Majority
Approach,20 the Progressive Minority,21 and the Per Se Inadmissible
Approach.22 The analysis then delves deeper into how each of the three
approaches uses Federal Evidence Rule 403 to exclude eyewitness
identification expert testimony.23 Part V of this Note advocates for reform
in the area of Federal Evidence Rule 403 and eyewitness identification
expert testimony admissibility.24 This Note proposes and assesses both a
legislative solution25 in the form of a specialized relevance rule and a
judicial solution26 in the form of the global adoption of the Progressive
Minority approach. After analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each
15. See infra Part II (summarizing the recent scientific findings that are often the
subject of an eyewitness identification expert’s testimony).
16. See infra Part II.B (expanding on the weak confidence-accuracy correlation and
confidence malleability).
17. See infra Part II.C (describing the ineffectiveness of cross-examination and jury
instructions as alternatives to eyewitness expert testimony).
18. See infra Part III (examining Federal Evidence Rule 403’s legislative history and
purpose).
19. See infra Part IV (summarizing the current federal circuit court split regarding the
admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony and dividing the approaches into
three categories).
20. Infra Part IV.B.
21. Infra Part IV.C.
22. Infra Part IV.D.
23. Infra Part IV.E.
24. See infra Part V.A–C (describing potential solutions to this problem and making a
recommendation as to which solution is the best).
25. Infra Part V.B.
26. Infra Part V.A.
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alternative, this Note will demonstrate that the legislative solution is the
superior alternative.27 In the area of eyewitness identification expert
testimony admissibility, the time has come for a limitation on the
unfettered discretion given to federal judges under Federal Evidence Rule
403.
II. Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony
A. General Overview
Eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful
convictions in the United States.28 Studies reveal that today nearly 80,000
suspects continue to be targeted every year based on eyewitness
identification with a roughly forty percent rate of misidentification.29
However, despite decades of research consistently revealing the inherent
unreliability of eyewitness identification,30 federal courts remain hostile
towards expert testimony explaining the unreliability of eyewitness
identifications.31
Expert testimony on eyewitness identification attempts to reveal to
the jury the complex psychological issues pertaining to perception and
memory which contribute to the unreliability of eyewitness
27. Infra Part V.C.
28. The Innocence Project, Fact Sheet on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php
(last visited Mar. 23, 2011) (finding that "Eyewitness [m]isidentification [t]estimony was a
factor in 74 percent of post-conviction DNA exoneration cases in the U.S.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See Henry Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CT. L. REV. 2, 4 (2007) (describing the
overwhelming amount of research and data indicating that erroneous eyewitness
identification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions); A.G. Goldstein, J.E. Chance &
G.R. Schneller, Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases: A Survey of
Prosecutors, 27 BULL. PSYCHOL. SOC’Y 71, 74 (Jan. 1989) (same).
30. See Loftus, supra note 12, at 243 (citing a 1983 Ohio State University doctoral
dissertation explaining that erroneous eyewitness identification is the most common reason
for the conviction of innocent people). See generally HADYN D. ELLIS, PRACTICAL ASPECTS
OF FACE MEMORY IN EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 12–13 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus
eds., 1984); ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 21 (1979); A. DANIEL YARMEY,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 57 (1979).
31. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that the majority approach in the federal circuit
courts is to regularly exclude eyewitness identification expert testimony); see also Fradella,
supra note 29, at 4 ("[T]his article is devoted to explaining why courts must change their
traditional hostility to expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.").
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identifications. This expert testimony is extremely important because the
scientific research on memory and eyewitness identification is "quite
counterintuitive and hardly commonsensical."32
A common fear
regarding eyewitness expert testimony is that it will "usurp the role of the
jury" and the expert will merely attempt to judge the credibility of a
particular witness.33 However, the eyewitness expert is not brought in to
judge the accuracy or believability of a particular eyewitness; rather the
expert provides the jury with critical information about the scientific
findings in this area with which jurors can then make a more informed
decision.34 Eyewitness identification experts can potentially testify about
numerous factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification
including suggestive line-up procedures,35 the weak confidence-accuracy
correlation,36 the exposure duration,37 cross-racial identification,38 weapon
32. See Fradella, supra note 29, at 24 (citing Edward Stein, The Admissibility of
Expert Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on Eyewitness Identification, in 2 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 295, 300 (2003)).
33. See, e.g., infra notes 181–83 and accompanying text (describing how the Smithers
district court felt eyewitness expert testimony would "invade the province of the jury" and
thus should be excluded).
34. See Fradella, supra note 29, at 23 ("The function of the expert here is not to say to
the jury—‘you should believe or not believe the eyewitness.’").
35. See, e.g., S. Sporer, S. Penrod, D. Read & B. Cutler, Choosing, Confidence, and
Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness
Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. No. 3 315, 316 (1995) (describing how police
instructions can influence a witness’s willingness to make an identification and the
likelihood the witness identifies a particular person). Additionally, the more members of a
lineup that closely resemble the suspect, the more likely the identification will be accurate.
Id.
36. See infra Part II.B (summarizing the confidence accuracy correlation).
37. See, e.g., Sporer et al., supra note 35, at 316 ("The less time an eyewitness has to
observe an event, the less well he or she will remember it.").
38. Generally, cross-racial identifications are less reliable than same race
identifications. See, e.g., Fradella, supra note 29, at 14 ("The result of cross-racial bias is a
higher rate of false positive identifications, especially when a Caucasian eyewitness
identifies an African-American suspect."); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 79 (2008) ("Social science studies have long shown that cross-racial
identifications are particularly error prone."); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The OtherRace Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 230, 231 (2001) ("[A] Black innocent suspect has a 56% greater chance of being
misidentified by a White eyewitness than by a Black eyewitness."); see also The Innocence
Project, Fact Sheet on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last visited Mar. 23,
2011) (finding that "[e]yewitness [m]isidentification [t]estimony was a factor in 74 percent of
post-conviction DNA exoneration cases in the U.S.") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review). The project also noted that at least 40% of the eyewitness identifications
involved a cross-racial identification. Id.
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focus,39 the impact of "double identification,"40 the effect of "post event
information" on an eyewitness,41 event violence, the "relation-back"
effect,42 and the stress level of the eyewitness, among many others.43 For
the narrow purposes of this Note, I will expand only on the findings in the
area of the confidence-accuracy correlation. This Note focuses on the
confidence-accuracy correlation for two important reasons. First, it is one
of most striking topics of eyewitness expert testimony because it is
extremely counterintuitive. Second, unlike many other areas of eyewitness

39. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 333–34 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining
that the "presence of a dangerous weapon can weaken one’s ability to recall other aspects of
a remembered scene, including individuals present therein"). Because most people are not
exposed to deadly weapons very often there is "a survival instinct that draws one’s attention
to potentially threatening objects" and makes recalling a particular individual more difficult.
Id. at 338.
40. See, e.g., id. at 333–34 (explaining "‘double identification’ as a problem in
determining whether one’s memory derives from one of two or more possible visual
exposures to an object"). "[S]uch post-event information can become incorporated with the
original memory, creating an inaccurately ‘remembered’ association between the image and
its source." Id.
41. See, e.g., Peter Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 246 (1996) (explaining
that access to facts after an occurrence can, under some circumstances, "change a witness’s
memory and even cause nonexistent details to become incorporated into a previously
acquired memory"); Fiona Gabbert et al., Memory Conformity: Can Eyewitnesses Influence
Each Other’s Memories For An Event?, 17 APPLIED COGN. PSYCHOL. 533, 540 (2003)
(finding that when witnesses discuss events with one another, shared false recollections can
result); Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony and Event Perception, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 7, 9–10 (1987) (same).
An experiment conducted by Elizabeth Loftus also illustrates the way that "post-event
information" can actually change one’s memory of an event. Loftus, supra note 41, at 9–10.
Two groups of witnesses were shown a film in which a car made a right-hand turn without
stopping at a stop sign and caused a multicar accident. Id. After the film the first question
for one group was, "How fast was car A going when it ran the stop sign?" Id. The first
question for the second group was, "How fast was car A going when it turned right?" Id.
The last question for both groups was whether they actually saw a stop sign. Id. 53% of the
first group reported they had seen a stop sign; only 35% of the second group responded that
they had seen the sign. Id. This suggests that the use of the words "stop sign" increased the
likelihood the sign would be recalled later on. Id. Thus, mentioning an object that does
exist will enhance the likelihood that a person will later tell you that he saw that object. Id.
42. See, e.g., Mathis, 264 F.3d at 341 (explaining the "relation back" effect refers to
the fact that "once a witness makes an identification, he or she will tend to stick with that
initial choice at subsequent photographic arrays or lineups, even if it was erroneous").
43. See, e.g., Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness
Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817, 825 (1995)
(listing a variety of factors which could potentially have an impact on the reliability of an
eyewitness identification).
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expert testimony, the confidence-accuracy correlation is relevant every time
an eyewitness takes the stand.
B. A Closer Look at the Weak Correlation Between
Confidence and Accuracy
"Eyewitness testimony is likely to be believed by jurors, especially
when it is offered with a high level of confidence, even though the accuracy
of an eyewitness and the confidence of that witness may not be related to
one another at all."44 Common intuition tells us that the more confident an
eyewitness is in their testimony the more likely it is that the witness is
accurate in their identification. And in fact, jurors habitually accord more
weight to a witness who testifies with confidence than to one who does
not.45 However, in this area "intuition is belied by scientific research,"
which reveals that in actuality there is an extremely weak correlation
between witness confidence and accuracy.46
One court recently noted that the confidence-accuracy correlation is at
best 25%, and this already weak correlation can easily drop to zero if
combined with other factors such as a short duration of interaction or poor
lighting at the identification scene, both of which weaken an
identification.47 Beyond the initial weak correlation between confidence
and accuracy, confidence is a poor predictor of accuracy because a

44. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)).
45. See, e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 825 ("A major source of juror
unreliability is reliance on witness confidence, a dubious indicator of eyewitness accuracy
even when measured at the time an identification is made."); Sowders, 449 U.S. at 352
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that eyewitness identification evidence has a powerful
impact on juries, especially when the witness is confident the defendant is the perpetrator);
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9, 19 (1979) (canvassing statistical and
psychological evidence supporting her conclusion that an eyewitness identification is
"overwhelmingly influential," particularly when the witness is confident that their
identification is correct).
46. See United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d. 1207, 1218 (M.D. Ala. 2009)
(describing the lack of correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy and stating
that "[i]n an instance such as this, where intuition is belied by scientific research, testimony
from an expert may be of great assistance to a jury").
47. See United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 334 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that the
eyewitness expert in the case testified that "the correspondence between confidence and
accuracy is, at best, about 25 percent," and that when conditions attending the recalled
memories are poor, "the relation between confidence and [accurate] memory is zero").
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witness’s confidence is very malleable.48 For example, the information a
witness gains throughout the investigation of a crime, through depositions
and pre-trial preparation, can significantly boost his or her confidence.49
Thus a witness may have a much higher level of confidence when testifying
at trial than at the time of the initial identification.50 This phenomenon
makes complete sense intuitively. Just like any presentation for work or
school, a speaker feels much more confident and comfortable after hours of
preparation and positive feedback from co-workers or family than the day
the speaker received the assignment. However, in the eyewitness
identification context, unlike the average work presentation, it is not
possible for time and preparation to increase the accuracy or knowledge of
the witness. Jurors often believe that they will be able to differentiate the
genuine and authentic confidence from the manufactured.51 But this
"confidence" has the same affect on jurors whether it is contrived and
practiced or whether it is natural.52
Another factor which contributes to confidence malleability and can
affect a witness’s confidence level is known as the "feedback factor."53
Studies show that witnesses who were told that another witness identified
the same suspect were significantly more confident than witnesses who
were given no feedback.54 Additionally, witnesses who were given
negative feedback and told a co-witness did not identify the same suspect

48. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 830 ("Given that confidence, when
measured immediately after the identification, is a modest predictor of accuracy, reductions
in reliability may render it utterly useless as an indicator of the accuracy of a witness’s
identification."). Additionally, it was further noted that studies have revealed "witnesses
who were questioned repeatedly grew more confident about the accuracy of details in their
reports." Id. at 827.
49. See id. at 827–30 ("These communications could have the unintended effects of
increasing witness confidence, reducing the diagnosticity of any confidence statements made
to the jury by the eyewitness, and elevating conviction rates.").
50. See id at 827–28 ("A simple instruction to rehearse the witnesses’ account, sample
questions that might be asked by a cross-examiner, and warnings that the cross-examiner
will look for inconsistencies in the testimony are sufficient to inflate the witnesses’
confidence in his or her memory.").
51. Id.
52. See id. at 827 ("[W]hen cross-examined, the briefed witnesses were significantly
more confident about their identifications than were unbriefed witnesses and were believed
more often by the jurors.").
53. See, e.g., id. at 829.
54. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 828–29 (noting that the study revealed the
"highest confidence levels obtained from witnesses who believed their co-witness had
identified the same individual").
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were considerably less confident than those who were given no feedback.55
This could occur at the police station if an officer gives an eyewitness this
type of feedback after making their initial identification.56 Suddenly, an
identification made by an initially hesitant and uncertain eyewitness
becomes the "correct answer" in their mind and the witness’s confidence
soars. Even if effective police practices are able to prevent this type of
feedback from occurring at the stationhouse, the witness is just as likely to
get this type of feedback information from his attorney.57 The true danger
of the "feedback factor" is how difficult it is to prevent because it can occur
at any stage or level of litigation through many potential sources.58
In summary, the weak confidence-accuracy correlation is clearly an
area where the scientific research is not within the common knowledge of
the jury, and thus the topic has become one of the most frequently testified
about by eyewitness identification experts.59 This lack of correlation
between confidence and accuracy is strong evidence of the serious need for
eyewitness identification expert testimony in our nation’s courtrooms. The
confidence-accuracy correlation is not a topic within the ken of the average
juror and can be relevant any time an eyewitness takes the stand. Contrary
to the current widespread belief that eyewitness expert testimony is a rare
remedy, testimony on the confidence-accuracy correlation is always going
to be helpful and informative to a jury.60
The eyewitness in Julius Ruffin’s case stopped dead in her tracks when
she saw Ruffin walk onto an elevator in the hospital where she worked.61 It
was weeks after the initial rape and though she had been through dozens of
55. See id. at 829 ("The lowest confidence levels were found among witnesses who
were told that the co-witness had indicated that the perpetrator was not in the array and
among witnesses who were initially told that the co-witness identified someone else.").
56. See, e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 829–30 (noting a concern that police
and attorneys will have an incentive to manipulate their witnesses’ confidence).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 830 ("It is perhaps just as likely, if not more likely, that witnesses are the
recipients of information provided to them by other witnesses (who may have made their
own identifications) and even the news media.").
59. See id. at 825 ("Research on the weak confidence accuracy relation is regarded as
a reliable basis for expert testimony by 87% of the respondents and was the second most
common issue about which experts had, in fact, testified.").
60. See supra Part IV.B (describing the Majority Approach’s current hostility towards
eyewitness expert testimony).
61. See The Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project, Case Profile on Julius Ruffin,
http://www.exonerate.org/case-profiles/julius-ruffin/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) (describing
Julius Ruffin’s story and the events leading up to his wrongful incarceration) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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suspect photos, she had been unable to identify her perpetrator.62 But when
she saw Julius Ruffin that day she was certain that he was her attacker.63
The victim proclaimed this genuine certainty to the jury that found Ruffin
guilty and sentenced an innocent man to life in prison.64 There is little to no
correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy,65 but Julius
Ruffin’s exoneration makes that seemingly simple statement much more
powerful and shines a light on the importance of expert testimony.66
C. Alternatives to Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony?
Many courts believe that expert testimony is not the only effective
means of relaying the dangers of eyewitness testimony to the jury. Most
commonly, courts reason that jury instructions and cross-examination
effectively highlight any reliability problems in an eyewitness’s
testimony.67
Cross-examination is thought to be an effective alternative to expert
testimony because both are tools that emphasize the potential unreliability
or lack of credibility of a particular eyewitness.68 However, as noted
earlier, expert testimony on eyewitness identification does not simply assess
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 47–48 (explaining the weak correlation between eyewitness
confidence and accuracy).
66. In addition to highlighting the confidence-accuracy correlation, Julius Ruffin could
have also benefited from expert testimony on the effects of cross-racial identification. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that cross-racial identifications are
generally less reliable). The phenomenon of "double identification" would have also been
relevant to Ruffin’s case. The victim and Ruffin both worked in the same hospital and thus
she may have seen him before and "remembered" his face but attached it to the wrong
situation. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining that double identification is
a problem in determining whether a memory derives from one of two or more possible
visual exposures to a person).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting
that cross-examination and jury instructions are common arguments against admitting expert
testimony); see also e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 825 (noting expert testimony,
judicial instructions, and cross-examination are the most commonly used tools to assist
jurors in assessing evidence).
68. See, e.g., United States v. McGinnis, 201 F. App’x 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2006) ("It
goes without saying that cross-examination serves a critical function, enabling jurors to
appreciate discrepancies in testimony."); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir.
1999) ("[A]ny weaknesses in eyewitness identification testimony ordinarily can be exposed
through careful cross-examination of the eyewitnesses.").
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the credibility of a particular eyewitness.69 The complex psychological
issues pertaining to perception and memory that contribute to the
unreliability of eyewitness identifications cannot be adequately explained to
a jury through cross-examination.70 Numerous studies reveal that crossexamination is an ineffective means of informing jurors about eyewitness
identification reliability issues.71 In particular, studies have shown crossexamination is particularly ineffective at increasing juror sensitivity to the
lack of correlation between witness confidence and accuracy.72 It is also
important to emphasize the difference between the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification generally and the credibility of an individual
witness. An eyewitness can be completely genuine and truly believe that he
or she is making a correct identification and yet still be mistaken. The
victim and eyewitness in Julius Ruffin’s case is a perfect example of a
genuine but mistaken eyewitness. The credibility and character of a witness
are distinct from the inherent memory and perception problems that can
affect an eyewitness’s accuracy. Thus, cross-examination is an ineffective
alternative to eyewitness identification expert testimony.
Additionally, jury instructions are an unacceptable alternative to
eyewitness expert testimony. Research indicates that jury instructions are
not effective at "integrating awareness" of the reliability problems with
eyewitness testimony or at increasing general skepticism to eyewitness
testimony.73 In particular, jury instructions do not effectively desensitize
the jurors to the weak confidence-accuracy correlation.74 This was found to
be true regardless of the timing of the jury instructions.75 Jury instructions
69. Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
70. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 819–20 (noting a study concluded that
cross-examination of a witness by an experienced attorney did not aid the jury in
determining accurate from inaccurate witnesses).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 834 (noting that because jurors often
find jury instructions so confusing, the instructions actually have the adverse effect of
decreasing juror sensitivity to eyewitness reliability issues); see also e.g., Ferensic v.
Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 481 (6th Cir. 2007) ("We agree with the district court that ‘other
means’ of attacking eyewitness identifications do not effectively substitute for expert
testimony on their inherent unreliability.").
74. See supra Part II.B (describing the weak correlation between eyewitness
confidence and accuracy); see also e.g., Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 833 (surmising
that the results of their study indicated that the jury instruction did not enhance skepticism or
sensitization and did not desensitize jurors to witness confidence).
75. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 43, at 833–34 (explaining that when the jury was
given the instructions did not make a significant difference on the overall effectiveness).
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are equally ineffective whether given right before the eyewitness takes the
stand or at the conclusion of the trial.76 Thus, when jury instructions are not
combined with testimony from an eyewitness expert, the instructions do not
provide an effective safeguard against mistaken identification.
In summary, both cross examination and judicial instructions to the
jury are ineffective mechanisms for informing the jury about eyewitness
identification reliability issues. Thus, this Note concludes that the
"alternatives" to eyewitness identification expert testimony currently used
in courtrooms across the country are unacceptable solutions and do not
combat the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifications.77
III. Federal Evidence Rule 403
A. Overview—History and Purpose
Federal Evidence Rule 40378 is meant to be a liberal rule which does
not allow exclusion of evidence if the evils of its admission are equal to its
probative value or even if they just slightly outweigh the probative value.
Federal Evidence Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."79 It is important to first note that Rule 403 allows for
exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence.80 Exclusion under Rule 403
requires the trial judge to find on balance that the probative81 value of the
76. Id.
77. To date, no court has held that eyewitness identifications are per se inadmissible,
and this Note does not argue for a per se exclusion of eyewitness testimony. Despite the
inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifications, identifications are sometimes correct.
Procedural fairness to the victim requires the justice system respect the right of the
eyewitness to testify if the testimony passes the necessary evidence relevance rules.
However, juror education and the admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony is
a necessary and essential component to eyewitness testimony.
78. FED. R. EVID. 403.
79. Id.
80. See id. at advisory committee’s note ("[C]ertain circumstances call for the
exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance.").
81. "‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401 (stating that evidence is
"probative" if it has some tendency to make a fact more or less probable). "A brick is not a
wall" and evidence will be probative if it contributes just one brick to the wall of proof built
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evidence is "substantially outweighed."82 Additionally, Rule 403 only
allows exclusion of evidence which is "unfairly" prejudicial; evidence
which is merely prejudicial will not be sufficient.83
Courts reviewing the legislative history of Federal Evidence Rule 403
have concluded that the evidence rule offers an "extraordinary remedy [to
be used] sparingly."84 Congress intended that judges would invoke this
"drastic remedy" infrequently and only when absolutely necessary.85 This
rule places the trial judge in a "gatekeeper" role and grants judges an
incredible amount of discretion.86 The congressional debates over the
proposed federal rules of evidence reveal that many in Congress and the
practicing bar were concerned that Federal Evidence Rule 403 granted
judges too much discretion and undue power.87 To pacify some of the
opposition to Rule 403, Congress attempted to structure the language to
grant judges "structured discretion."88 Unlike many other Federal Evidence

by a party. Id. at advisory committee’s note (quoting McCormick § 152).
82. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
83. See id. at advisory committee’s note ( "‘Unfair prejudice’ within its context means
an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one.").
84. See, e.g., United States v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that
Rule 403 is "‘an extraordinary remedy which the district court should invoke sparingly,’ and
‘[t]he balance . . . should be struck in favor of admissibility’" (quoting United States v.
Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th Cir. 1989))).
85. See Edward Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of
Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 906 (1998) (noting Congress’s purpose in enacting Rule
403 and arguing the rule should be interpreted narrowly so as not to improperly resurrect the
common law rules of evidence).
86. See id. at 905 ("The concept of prejudice permits a judge to safeguard the integrity
of the fact-finding process."). It is the judge’s role under Rule 403 to protect the "integrity
of the fact-finding process." Id. at 894.
87. See C. Wright & K. Graham, Statutory History: Rule 403, 22 FED. PRAC. & PROC.
EVID. § 5211 (1st ed. 2009) ("The concept of mandatory exclusion for prejudice was taken
from a New Jersey proposal and was apparently intended to mollify critics who had attacked
earlier reform proposals for an excessive use of discretion."). "During Congressional
consideration, Rule 403 was labeled ‘controversial.’" Id.; see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 1
WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 403–13 (Bender 1975) (describing the motivation for the original
Rule 403; a commentary by Judge Weinstein, a member of the Advisory Committee).
88. Wright & Graham, supra note 87, at §5211; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 85,
at 893–94 ("[R]ule 403 lists several factors that a judge may balance against the probative
value of the evidence. Unlike many lists in article IV of the Federal Rules, the list in rule 403
does not begin with the language, ‘such as.’ On its face, the list purports to be exhaustive.").
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Rules, Rule 403 sets out an exhaustive list of factors with which the judge
can balance against the probative value of the evidence.89
The legislative history of Federal Evidence Rule 403 reveals that
Congress clearly attempted to have the language limit a judge’s
discretionary power by prescribing a list of factors and a balancing
procedure which must be conducted. However, the reality is that a trial
judge’s decision to exclude evidence under Federal Evidence Rule 403 is
reviewed for abuse of discretion and is very rarely reversed.90 Although
courts recognize that Rule 403 offers a remedy to be used "sparingly," it
continues to be a frequently used tool for the exclusion of eyewitness
identification expert testimony in a majority of the federal circuits.91 The
appellate courts have been using the grant of discretion under Rule 403 as a
"magic elixir to resolve all issues of admissibility."92
B. "Cocktail Rulings"—Rule 403, Rule 702 and the Daubert Standard
In the context of eyewitness identification expert testimony
admissibility, it is important to understand how Federal Evidence Rule 403
interacts with the other evidence rules governing the admissibility of expert

89. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note ("The rule does not
enumerate surprise as a ground for exclusion . . . ."). Thus since the text omits any mention
of surprise, the "judge cannot consider surprise in the rule 403 balancing process. That
statement would be a non sequitur unless the list in rule 403 is exclusive." Imwinkelried,
supra note 85, at 893–94.
90. Abuse of discretion review can act as "a virtual shield from reversal." ROGER PARK
ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW § 12.01, 540–41 & n.6 (1998); see also e.g., U.S. v. Dodds, 347 F.3d
893, 897 (2003) ("This Court reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings for a clear abuse
of discretion."); Wright & Graham, supra note 87, at § 5211 ("[A]ny grant of discretion
carries with it a limited immunity from appellate review. That is, the trial judge will be
reversed only where he has abused his discretion or refused to exercise it."). But see Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (holding that the admission of a prior conviction
was unfairly prejudicial and it was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403 for the trial court
to admit testimony regarding the conviction when the defendant had agreed to a stipulation);
United States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582, 589–90 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that it was an abuse
of discretion for a trial judge to omit a Rule 403 balancing analysis altogether when an
objection was made by the defendant).
91. See infra Part IV.B and Part IV.E.2 (describing the majority approach and their
treatment of Federal Evidence Rule 403).
92. See Wright & Graham, supra note 87 ("Seldom have the appellate courts insisted
on the careful balancing envisaged by Rule 403; instead, they rely on a sloppy, free-floating
conception of discretion as a magic elixir to resolve all issues of admissibility.").
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testimony. Federal Evidence Rule 70293 governs the admissibility of expert
testimony in the federal courts. Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.94

Additionally, Rule 702 provides that an expert witness must be properly
qualified, must testify about a topic that is beyond the ken of the average
juror, must have an adequate factual basis for her opinion, and the expert’s
testimony must be the product of relevant and reliable methods.95 In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,96 the Supreme Court directed the
lower courts to conduct a two-step test in determining the admissibility of
expert testimony. First, the court must determine whether the expert’s
testimony reflects valid and reliable "scientific knowledge" and "whether
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue."97 Second, the court moves on to the "fit" prong and must ask
whether the testimony is relevant to the task at hand and whether it will
serve to aid the trier of fact.98 A common argument for exclusion of
eyewitness identification expert testimony in the federal courts is that it
would not be of assistance to the jury because the information is within the
"ordinary knowledge of most lay jurors" and thus would not satisfy Rule
702 or the "fit" prong of Daubert.99
93. FED. R. EVID. 702.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (articulating a
two-step test that trial courts must use in determining whether evidence and expert testimony
is admissible).
97. Id. at 592–94 (noting a court should address "whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication," and whether it has achieved general
acceptance in the particular scientific community).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., infra Part IV.D (explaining that the Eleventh Circuit has determined that
eyewitness expert testimony is per se inadmissible in large part because the jury can weigh
the issues through common-sense evaluation); see also United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d
1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding "that a district court does not abuse it [sic] discretion in
excluding such testimony.").
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It is important to understand the exclusion analysis frequently
proffered under Rule 702 and Daubert because those arguments often
overlap with the arguments given under Rule 403. For example, a court
may find that eyewitness expert testimony is within the ken of the average
juror and thus will not assist the juror under Rule 702. As a consequence,
any expert testimony allowed in would "usurp the role of the jury" and
would also be unduly prejudicial under Rule 403. I refer to this common
overlapping analysis as "cocktail rulings."100 The analysis is muddled
further by the fact that the courts regularly cite both Rule 702 and 403 for
the decision to exclude, often without specifically enumerating a separate
analysis under each rule.101 The appellate courts are then left to parse vague
records, often assuming an acceptable reason for exclusion and then
avoiding any further problem by deferring to the trials court’s discretion.
This has created enormous inconsistency in the federal courts. Not only are
the federal courts split in how they treat eyewitness expert testimony
generally and the amount of deference they are willing to grant,102 but
deferral to these "cocktail rulings" allows conflicting decisions and
reasoning in the lower courts to stand. We are left with an unpredictable,
standardless deferral to the trial judge’s discretion that has created a deep
dissension among the lower courts regarding how eyewitness expert
testimony should be treated.
Thus, an exclusion of eyewitness
identification expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403 is often
intertwined with Rule 702 and the Daubert analysis, and it is important to
highlight their relationship.103
100. The federal courts often exclude eyewitness expert testimony under multiple rules
(702, 703, 704 and 403 for example) with the exclusion analysis under each thrown together
like different types of alcohol in a cocktail.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313–18 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting
the district court held the expert testimony was within the jurors’ "common knowledge"
under Federal Evidence Rule 702 and would cause "delay" under Federal Evidence Rule
403); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1050–51 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the district
court excluded the expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 702 because the testimony
would not be helpful for the jury, which was "generally aware of the problems with
identification" and because the testimony would be unduly confusing and a waste of time
under Federal Evidence Rule 403).
102. See infra Part IV (describing the current federal circuit court split).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that
when district courts fail to explain their rulings under Rule 403, "we are able to perform this
balancing here" but some cases may require a remand or new trial). But see United States v.
Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing a district court’s decision to exclude
eyewitness testimony based on Rules 403 and 702 and noting that the district court’s
reasoning under Rule 403 was too conclusory).
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C. The Specialized Relevance Rules

It is also important to understand the specialized relevance rules and
how they relate to Federal Evidence Rule 403. A specialized relevance rule
reflects Congress’s judgment that, as a matter of law, the evidence it
governs fails a Federal Evidence Rule 403 balancing test.104 The five
specialized relevance rules deal with evidence of low probative power.105
For example, Federal Evidence Rule 411 declares evidence that one party
has liability insurance is not admissible to show "the person acted
negligently or otherwise wrongfully."106 The specialized relevance rules
not only reflect a congressional declaration of the relevancy of particular
evidence, but they also reflect public policy concerns.107 In the case of Rule
411, exclusion of liability insurance information encourages people to get
insurance and avoids a windfall for the opponent of an insured party.108
Most of the specialized relevance rules share a similar structure and
prohibit only certain uses of the evidence they govern but permit all other
uses.109 However, Rule 410 is different in that it prohibits guilty plea
evidence for all purposes and specifies only two circumstances where
admissibility is proper.110
Specialized relevance rules are significant because they are
congressional determinations that in certain situations the courts do not
have discretion to conduct a balancing test under Federal Evidence Rule
403. In limited situations Congress has found a legislative solution
necessary to cure important public policy issues with regard to relevance
and Rule 403. The structure of the specialized relevance rule is a potential
solution for the massive problem with eyewitness identification expert
testimony admissibility.111 It may be time for public policy and procedural

104. Federal Evidence Rules 407–11 are known as the "specialized relevance rules."
See, e.g., MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.11 at 183 n.8 (3d. ed. 2003) (describing
the specialized relevance rules).
105. Id.
106. FED. R. EVID. 411.
107. See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104; GEORGE FISHER,
EVIDENCE 90–92 (2d ed. 2008).
108. See FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee notes ("Knowledge of the presence or
absence of liability insurance would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds.").
109. FED. R. EVID. 407–09 and 411; supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110. FED. R. EVID. 410.
111. See infra Part V.A (describing a specialized relevance rule that could serve as a
potential solution for eyewitness identification expert testimony admissibility).
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justice to limit judicial discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony
under Federal Evidence Rule 403.112
D. Summary of Federal Evidence Rule 403
As summarized above, Federal Evidence Rule 403 is a powerful tool
which grants trial judges a tremendous amount of discretion. An
examination of the legislative history and purpose behind Rule 403 revealed
that the rule was intended to be used "sparingly" to combat only extreme
evils that substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.113
However, the limited appellate review for Rule 403 exclusions has in many
ways nullified any parameters which Congress may have intended to place
on judicial discretion.114 In the context of this Note, this gap between the
purpose of the rule and the reality of how it is exercised is significant when
research reveals that Rule 403 is one of the most commonly cited sources
for the exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony.115
IV. Circuit Split
As noted in Part III, Federal Evidence Rule 403 states that "[a]lthough
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."116 Thus, it is within the trial
court’s discretion to exclude otherwise relevant and admissible expert
testimony.117 Rule 403 allows trial judges to exclude the expert testimony
if the probative value is outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury,
delaying the trial, or causing unfair prejudice.118
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 84, 86 and accompanying text (examining the legislative history
behind Rule 403).
114. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting that a trial judge’s decision is
reviewed for abuse of discretion under Rule 403 and is rarely reversed).
115. See infra Part IV.E (examining the current federal circuit split in the admission of
eyewitness identification expert testimony).
116. FED. R. EVID. 403.
117. FED. R. EVID. 403.
118. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note ("Situations in this area call for
balancing the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result
from its admission.").
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Due to this large grant of judicial discretion, the circuits have split on
whether the admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony can
violate Rule 403.119 The majority of circuits have held that eyewitness
identification expert testimony should not be admissible under Federal
Evidence Rule 403.120 These circuits reason that the expert testimony might
usurp the jury’s role of determining witness credibility, thus causing jurors
to be confused and misled as to their roles as the finders of fact.121 The
Third and Sixth Circuits, referred to in this Note as the Progressive
Minority, have ruled that eyewitness identification expert testimony
comports with Rule 403.122 These circuits explain that as long as the
experts employ "reliable scientific expertise" to pertinent aspects of the
human mind and body, the experts should be "welcomed" by the federal
courts.123
A. Overview
The treatment of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification
by the federal circuit courts has experienced dramatic changes over the last
thirty years and is still evolving today.124 In the 1970s and early 1980s,
119. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1219–20 (M.D. Ala. 2009)
(noting a circuit split regarding whether eyewitness-identification expert testimony violates
Federal Evidence Rule 403).
120. See United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding a district
court was within its discretion to exclude an expert who "would effectively have inserted his
own view of the officer’s credibility for that of the jurors, thereby usurping their role"); see
also United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying a deferential standard
to conclude that "the district court properly recognized the very real danger that the proffered
expert testimony could either confuse the jury or cause it to substitute the expert’s credibility
assessment for its own"); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992)
("[T]he district court’s decision to exclude Dr. Loftus’ testimony was a proper exercise of its
discretion, whether under Rule 702 or Rule 403.").
121. Supra note 120 and accompanying text.
122. See United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing a
district court’s decision to exclude eyewitness testimony based on Rules 403 and 702); see
also United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) (concluding that a trial
court erred in excluding an eyewitness-identification expert under Rule 403); United States
v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that eyewitness-identification expert
testimony did not violate Rule 403’s prohibition against evidence that invites unjustified
"delay").
123. See, e.g., Mathis, 264 F.3d at 340 ("[E]xperts who apply reliable scientific
expertise to juridically pertinent aspects of the human mind and body should generally,
absent explicable reasons to the contrary, be welcomed by federal courts, not turned away.").
124. See, e.g., Smithers, 212 F.3d at 311 (noting that the treatment of eyewitness
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courts were uniformly resistant towards eyewitness experts.125 The
concerns commonly noted by the federal courts included the view that the
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification were within the common
knowledge of the jury,126 such expert testimony did not possess general
acceptance in the scientific community,127 any weaknesses in an
eyewitnesses’ identification could be revealed effectively through crossexamination,128 and the admission of eyewitness expert testimony would be
unduly prejudicial.129 Though most of the above concerns still have a
strong presence in the courts today, in the mid to late 1980s there was a
strong shift towards acknowledging the scientific validity of eyewitness
expert testimony and the study of the psychological factors which influence
the memory process.130
Today, a majority of the federal circuits take a "discretionary
approach"131 and defer to district courts’ decisions on whether to admit
identification expert testimony has experienced changes that coincide with the growth in
modern scientific studies that highlight the problems with eyewitness identification); United
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Judicial resistance to the
introduction of this kind of expert testimony is understandable given its innovativeness and
the fear of trial delay spawned by the spectre of the creation of a cottage industry of forensic
psychologists.").
125. See, e.g., Smithers, 212 F.3d at 311 (explaining that defense attorneys began to
bring expert eyewitness testimony into the courtroom in the early 1970s but that the courts
were still very skeptical about admitting such testimony); United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d
532, 534 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that "[u]ntil fairly recently, most, if not all, courts excluded
expert psychological testimony on the validity of eyewitness identification").
126. See, e.g., United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that
the question is within the expertise of jurors).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no
general acceptance in the scientific community).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) (reasoning
that the eyewitness identification was adequately addressed through cross-examination);
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the district court
did not err in excluding expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification because crossexamination was sufficient to reveal any weaknesses in the identifications).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (ruling that the
testimony would be prejudicial).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding
that "[i]n a case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewitness identification, expert
testimony regarding the accuracy of that identification is admissible and properly may be
encouraged "); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985) (reasoning
that "expert testimony on eyewitness perception and memory [should] be admitted at least in
some circumstances"); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The
day may have arrived, therefore, when Dr. Fulero’s testimony can be said to conform to a
generally accepted explanatory theory.").
131. See McMullen v. State, 714 So.2d 368, 370–71 (Fla. 1998) (dividing the various

786

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 765 (2011)

expert testimony on eyewitness identification.132 However, within this
general majority model of respecting the discretion of the lower courts,
some circuits clearly tend to favor or disfavor the admittance of eyewitness
expert testimony. The approaches currently taken by the circuit courts can
be grouped into three categories.133 First, there is the majority approach
which tends to favor or presume exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony
in all but the most "narrow" of circumstances.134 Second, a small group of
jurisdictional approaches on this issue into categories, "discretionary" and "prohibitory," and
explaining that the discretionary approach is the majority view on both the federal and state
level). The Florida Supreme Court described the discretionary approach as granting trial
court discretion as to whether to admit such testimony. Id. at 370.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2006)
("[W]e have consistently maintained that the admission of such testimony is a matter of
case-by-case discretion and have refused to adopt such a blanket rule for its admission or
exclusion."); United States v. Martin, 391 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2004) (reviewing the
lower court’s exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony for abuse of discretion); United
States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 288–89 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A decision to exclude expert
testimony rests soundly with the discretion of the trial court and shall be sustained unless
‘manifestly erroneous.’"); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104–06 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding that the district court’s preclusion of the eyewitness expert evidence was a proper
exercise of discretion whether under Rule 702 or 403); United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d
1046, 1052–54 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding the district court did not abuse their discretion in
refusing to admit the expert testimony); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir.
1994) ("Given the powerful nature of expert testimony, coupled with its potential to mislead
the jury, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that the proffered evidence
would not assist the trier of fact and that it was likely to mislead the jury."); United States v.
Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534–35 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court’s exclusion of
eyewitness identification expert testimony and noting that most circuits eschew a per se rule
about admissibility for a discretionary approach); but see United States v. Brownlee, 454
F.3d 131, 141–44 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversing the district court for abuse of discretion in
refusing to allow eyewitness expert testimony).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d. 1207, 1219–20 (M.D. Ala.
2009) (noting a circuit split regarding whether eyewitness-identification expert testimony
violates Federal Evidence Rule 403); McMullen, 714 So. 2d at 370–71 (describing the
federal circuit court split and grouping the circuit’s approaches in terms of "discretionary" or
"prohibitory").
134. See, e.g., United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906–07 (7th Cir. 2009)
(affirming the exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony because there were multiple
witnesses who identified the defendant and some of the witnesses knew the defendant well
and were not strangers to him); United States v. Villiard, 186 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1999)
(finding no abuse of discretion in denying expert eyewitness identification testimony
because the government’s case did not rest exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness
testimony); United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1053–54 (10th Cir. 1998) (refusing to
find "narrow circumstances" existed for there were five eyewitnesses and not just one);
United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The narrow circumstances held
sufficient to support the introduction of expert testimony have varied but have included such
problems as cross-racial identification, identification after a long delay, identification after
observation under stress, and [such] psychological phenomena as the feedback factor and
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circuits takes a more progressive approach and generally favors admission
and recognizes the importance of eyewitness identification expert
testimony.135 Third, the Eleventh Circuit is the last remaining circuit to
mandate a per se rule of exclusion for eyewitness identification expert
testimony.136
B. The Majority Approach
The Majority Approach contains almost all of the circuits and
routinely excludes expert testimony on eyewitness identification.137 These
circuits have recently begun to accept the scientific validity of eyewitness
identification experts and the importance of admitting expert testimony in
certain limited circumstances.138 However, most of the circuits taking the
Majority Approach still generally disfavor admission and narrowly define
the situations where admission may be necessary.139 For example, the
unconscious transference.").
135. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 339–40 (3d Cir. 2001) (examining
an eyewitness expert’s methods and "welcom[ing]" such testimony); United States v.
Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311–18 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that a district court erred in not
admitting eyewitness-identification expert testimony); Moore, 786 F.2d at 1313 (5th Cir.
1986) (finding that, under some circumstances, eyewitness-identification expert testimony
"properly may be encouraged"); Smith, 736 F.2d at 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The day may have
arrived, therefore, when Dr. Fulero’s testimony can be said to conform to a generally
accepted explanatory theory.").
136. See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that "a
district court does not abuse its discretion when it excludes expert testimony on eyewitness
identification"); see also United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir. 1992)
(describing the "established rule" of the Eleventh Circuit that eyewitness identification
expert testimony was not admissible); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315 (11th
Cir. 1984) ("[Defendant’s] contention that the district court incorrectly excluded expert
testimony concerning identification also lacks merit because such testimony is not
admissible in this circuit."). But see Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d. at 1214 (questioning the
Eleventh Circuit’s per se exclusion rule and noting that "[n]either Smith nor Thevis
addressed . . . whether a district court abuses its discretion by admitting this evidence
pursuant to the analysis required by Rule 702 and Daubert").
137. For purposes of this analysis I have included the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in this grouping.
138. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (listing cases that have acknowledged
"narrow circumstances" where admissibility would be necessary but nevertheless
distinguished their factual situation and excluded the expert testimony).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104 (7th Cir. 1999) ("This Court
has a long line of cases which reflect our disfavor of expert testimony on the reliability of
eyewitness identification."); United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 885 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the Eighth Circuit is "especially hesitant to find an abuse of discretion" in denying
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Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Harris,140 defined "narrow
circumstances" as including "such problems as cross-racial identification,
identification after a long delay, identification after observation under
stress, and psychological phenomena such as the feedback factor and
unconscious transference."141 However, the court’s application of this
definition to the facts at hand illuminates the tendency of the circuits in this
group to distinguish their cases from the "narrow circumstance" if at all
possible. Harris dealt with a bank robbery and three bank employees who
served as witnesses identifying the defendant.142 The defendant admitted he
was in the bank earlier that day, and thus the witnesses were testifying both
that they saw the defendant earlier that day and that he robbed the bank.143
The defendant argued that the expert’s testimony regarding cross-racial
identifications144 and memory in stressful situations would be particularly
relevant; however, the court did not find the argument persuasive. The
court stated that since one of the three eyewitnesses was also AfricanAmerican, the cross-racial identification issue was effectively eliminated
for the other two Caucasian witnesses.145 The court also stated that because
the eyewitnesses claimed to have seen the defendant in the bank earlier that
day, the stress factor of the identification during the later bank robbery was
no longer an issue.146 Lastly, the court used a common theory147 for
eyewitness expert testimony); United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1987)
(noting eyewitness expert testimony is generally inadmissible except when the case depends
primarily on eyewitness identification).
140. See United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534–36 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the
exclusion of expert testimony by the district court and noting that except under narrow
circumstances "[t]his type of evidence, almost by definition, can be of no assistance to a
jury").
141. Id. at 535.
142. Id. at 533.
143. Id.
144. See supra note 38 (summarizing scientific findings in the area of cross-racial
identifications).
145. See Harris, 995 F.2d at 536 ("Race did not play a role in these identifications—
while Harris is black, Watkins is also black, and her testimony was almost identical to that of
Dean and White.").
146. See id. ("All of these identifications happened over five to twenty minute intervals,
and none occurred under circumstances that could be deemed stressful, except Dean’s
confrontation with the robber." (emphasis added)).
147. See also, e.g., United States v. McGinnis, 201 F. App’x 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2006)
("It goes without saying that cross-examination serves a critical function, enabling jurors to
appreciate discrepancies in testimony."); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir.
1999) ("[A]ny weaknesses in eyewitness identification testimony ordinarily can be exposed
through careful cross-examination of the eyewitnesses.").
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keeping eyewitness expert testimony out stating that "any discrepancies in
these testimonies were brought out or could have been brought out on
cross-examination."148
The Majority Approach commonly denies the admission of eyewitness
expert testimony if there is any corroborating evidence other than the
eyewitness identification. For example, the Seventh Circuit stated that
"[g]enerally speaking, the existence of corroborating evidence undercuts the
need, except in the most compelling cases, for expert testimony on
eyewitness identifications."149 The Fifth Circuit also takes a strong position
and notes that except "in a case in which the sole testimony is casual
eyewitness identification," expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that
identification is not to be encouraged.150 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit is
"especially hesitant" to admit eyewitness expert testimony unless the case
rests "exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony."151 The above
examples demonstrate that the admission of eyewitness identification expert
testimony is easy to avoid if circuits take an extreme position on when an
eyewitness identification expert will be needed.
In summary, the majority of circuits generally do not allow eyewitness
expert testimony unless the entire case against the defendant rests solely on
an uncorroborated eyewitness. These circuits tend to avoid and disfavor
eyewitness expert testimony for fear that admittance will accomplish
nothing other "than to muddy the waters."152 In the case of Julius Ruffin,
eyewitness expert testimony would have almost certainly been excluded
under the Majority Approach. Although the victim was the only eyewitness
to testify at trial, there was additional corroborating DNA evidence.153 The
scientific testing performed on the semen sample displayed that only 8% of
all African-American men could be a potential match, and Ruffin was in
that limited group.154
Under the Majority Approach, this limited
corroborating evidence would have been sufficient to differentiate the
148. United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 536 (4th Cir. 1993).
149. Hall, 165 F.3d at 1107 (emphasis added).
150. McGinnis, 201 F. App’x at 249 (emphasis added).
151. See United States v. Villiard, 186 F.3d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added)
(finding no abuse of discretion in denying expert eyewitness identification testimony
because the government’s case did not rest exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness
testimony).
152. See United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that the
eyewitness identification expert testimony would do nothing other than "muddy the waters").
153. Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
154. Id.
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"narrow circumstances" where eyewitness expert testimony must be
respected.
C. The Progressive Minority
The Progressive Minority, consisting of the Third and the Sixth
Circuits, leads the way in recognizing the potential value in eyewitness
identification expert testimony. The progressive approach of these circuits
is exemplified by their refusal to accept many of the common reasonings
given by the other circuits as a basis for rejection. In United States v.
Downing,155 the Sixth Circuit addressed several lines of reasoning given by
other courts in the past for exclusion of eyewitness identification expert
testimony. The Court found the notions of cross-examination, common
sense, usurping the role of the jury, and undue confusion to be unpersuasive
arguments for exclusion.156 The Court disavowed skepticism towards
eyewitness expert testimony as a matter of principal and stated that, rather,
the "admission depends upon the ‘fit,’ i.e., upon a specific proffer showing
that scientific research has established that particular features of the
eyewitness identifications involved may have impaired the accuracy of
those identifications."157 The Downing case set the stage for the liberal view
that the Third and Sixth Circuits would cultivate over the next twenty years.
Recently, in United States v. Brownlee,158 the Third Circuit noted that
expert testimony should have been admitted because "‘witnesses oftentimes
profess considerable confidence in erroneous identifications,’ and expert
testimony was the only method of imparting the knowledge concerning
confidence-accuracy correlation to the jury."159 Brownlee reversed even a
limited exclusion of expert testimony and recognized the importance of
confidence-accuracy testimony when the defense rested on the reliability of
the government’s four eyewitnesses.160
155. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding "the
liberal standard of admissibility mandated by Rule 702").
156. See id. at 1229–30 ("We have serious doubts about whether the conclusion reached
by these courts is consistent with the liberal standard of admissibility mandated by Rule
702.").
157. Id. at 1226.
158. See United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 144 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that it
was wrong to exclude expert testimony regarding the correlation between confidence and
accuracy when the defense’s case rested on the reliability of the government’s witnesses).
159. Id.
160. See id. ("[W]e hold it was wrong to exclude expert testimony regarding the
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The Sixth Circuit stated that expert testimony is important because
eyewitness identification expert testimony "inform[s] the jury of why the
eyewitnesses’ identifications were inherently unreliable" and, thus, provides
a "scientific, professional perspective that no one else [can] offer to the
jury."161 In the Sixth Circuit’s view, the significance of an expert’s
testimony "cannot be overstated" because, without it, a jury has "no basis
beyond defense counsel’s word to suspect the inherent unreliability" of an
eyewitness identification.162 The inherent unreliability of eyewitness
identifications is not common knowledge and thus it is the exact situation
where expert testimony is needed. As the court itself neatly stated in
United States v. Smithers,163 there is an inherent "dichotomy between
eyewitness errors and jurors’ reliance on eyewitness testimony, therefore
this Circuit has held that expert testimony on the subject of eyewitness
identification is admissible."164 Thus, the Progressive Minority recognizes
the importance of eyewitness identification expert testimony and generally
favors admission.
In the case of Julius Ruffin, eyewitness identification expert testimony
would have most likely been admitted under the Progressive Minority
approach.165 Given that the government’s case rested almost entirely on
one eyewitness identification, this is the exact circumstance where the
Progressive Minority has found expert testimony to be important.
However, it is important to emphasize that although the Progressive
Minority tends to favor admission, it does not have a per se admissible
approach. Thus, Ruffin would not have been guaranteed eyewitness expert
testimony. If a lower court found the corroborating DNA evidence in
Ruffin’s case to be sufficient to overcome the "narrow circumstances"
described in Downing, there is a strong chance the appellate court would

reliability of the very eyewitness identification evidence on which Brownlee was convicted,
and remand the case for a new trial.").
161. See Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 477–80 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
exclusion of the defense eyewitness identification expert impermissibly interfered with the
defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense).
162. Id. at 482.
163. See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing the
district court and holding that the district court should have conducted a hearing under
Daubert and analyzed the evidence to determine whether the expert’s proffered testimony
reflected scientific knowledge, and whether the testimony was relevant and would have
aided the trier of fact).
164. Id. at 312.
165. See supra note 2 (describing the case against Julius Ruffin).
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have deferred to the trial judge’s discretion.166 The Progressive Minority
has made significant strides towards respecting eyewitness identification
expert testimony; however, the trend remains unpredictable given the strong
deference to trial courts’ decisions.
D. Per Se Inadmissible Approach
The Eleventh Circuit stands alone in its approach and takes an extreme
position against eyewitness identification expert testimony, holding that
such testimony is per se inadmissible. In United States v. Holloway,167 the
appellant argued that the refusal to admit eyewitness identification
testimony was in error. The court dismissed the argument stating simply
that "[t]he established rule of this circuit is that such testimony is not
admissible."168 The Eleventh Circuit reasons that eyewitness identification
expert testimony is merely "marginally relevant psychological evidence"
and problems of perception and memory are more "adequately addressed in
cross-examination" or "through common-sense evaluation."169
Recently, in United States v. Smith,170 the defendant argued that the
new standard announced in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals171
conflicted with the Eleventh Circuit’s per se inadmissibility approach.172
166. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985).
167. See United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
established rule of the Eleventh Circuit is to exclude eyewitness identification expert
testimony).
168. Id. at 679; see also United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315–16 (11th Cir.
1984) (stating that the defendant’s "contention that the district court incorrectly excluded
expert testimony concerning identification also lacks merit because such testimony is not
admissible in this circuit").
169. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing to admit
eyewitness identification expert testimony and stating that "[t]o admit such testimony in
effect would permit the proponent’s witness to comment on the weight and credibility of
opponents’ witnesses and open the door to a barrage of marginally relevant psychological
evidence").
170. See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming earlier
precedent creating a per se rule of inadmissibility).
171. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)
(articulating a two-step test that trial courts must use in determining whether evidence and
expert testimony is admissible). First, the court must determine whether the expert’s
testimony reflects valid and reliable "scientific knowledge," and "whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Id. at 592–93. Second, the court
must ask whether the expert testimony is "fit." For this the court must look at whether the
testimony is relevant to the task at hand and whether it will serve to aid the trier of fact. Id.
172. See Smith, 122 F.3d at 1358 ("Smith argues that Daubert ‘lower[ed] the standard
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The court stated that it need not even address the argument because under
Daubert, expert testimony that does not assist the finder of fact can be
excluded.173 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has evaded the issue of whether this
per se inadmissibility rule really holds up under Daubert and instead merely
confirmed that it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find
that eyewitness identification expert testimony is not admissible because it
does not aid the jury in any way.174
However, dissension is growing in the Eleventh Circuit, and the lower
courts have recently attempted to address the unanswered issue about
whether the per se rule of inadmissibility should remain in effect. In United
States v. Smith,175 the district court admitted eyewitness identification
expert testimony.176 The court stated that it felt a "per se proscription
against all eyewitness-identification expert testimony is irreconcilable with
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert."177
Though recent district court cases out of the Eleventh Circuit have
begun to question this hostile position, the per se exclusion rule and
precedents finding no value in eyewitness expert testimony still remain the
law and shape the approach taken in the Eleventh Circuit today. In the case
of Julius Ruffin,178 this antiquated approach would strip him of any chance
to admit eyewitness expert testimony. Ruffin’s case perfectly demonstrates
the extreme dangers inherent in the Eleventh Circuit’s approach. Without
even the limited "narrow circumstances" respect given to eyewitness expert
testimony by the Majority Approach,179 the Eleventh Circuit leaves an
for admissibility of expert evidence’ and thus opened the door for admitting expert
testimony regarding eyewitness reliability.").
173. Id. at 1359.
174. See id. at 1359 ("Thevis held that expert testimony regarding eyewitness reliability
does not assist the jury, and we conclude that that holding is in harmony with Daubert.
Therefore, it is as true after Daubert as it was before that a district court does not abuse it
discretion in excluding such testimony.").
175. See United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d. 1207, 1219–20 (M.D. Ala. 2009)
(affirming the admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony at trial and rejecting
the government’s motion to exclude).
176. Id.
177. See id. at 1211 (stating that Daubert "eschewed such categorical prohibitions of
entire classes of expert conclusions; in determining whether to admit testimony, the Court
stated, the focus ‘must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate’" (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 595
(1993))).
178. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the Julius Ruffin case).
179. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B (explaining that the majority approach recognizes that in
certain narrow circumstances, particularly when eyewitness testimony is the sole evidence
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innocent man with no safeguard against an eyewitness who points at him
and says, "He is the one!"
E. The Circuit Split and Federal Evidence Rule 403
Now that the general approaches currently taken in the federal circuit
courts with regard to eyewitness identification expert testimony
admissibility have been examined, this Note will delve into a closer
examination regarding how the circuits are treating attempts to exclude
eyewitness expert testimony using Federal Evidence Rule 403. In
particular, this section will highlight the differences between the
Progressive Minority’s and the Majority Approach’s treatment of Federal
Evidence Rule 403.
1. The Progressive Minority and Rule 403
In United States v. Smithers180 the respondent argued that eyewitness
identification expert testimony should not be admitted because it was within
the common knowledge of the jury, it would invade the province of the
jury, and admittance would cause "delay" under Federal Evidence Rule
403.181 First, the district court stated that "a jury can fully understand" its
"obligation to be somewhat skeptical of eyewitness testimony."182 The
Sixth Circuit dismissed this argument as not only contrary to the scientific
evidence showing jurors are "unduly receptive" rather than skeptical
towards eyewitness testimony, but also because this reasoning would lead
to a virtual per se exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony.183
against a defendant, expert testimony may be appropriate).
180. See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing the
district court and holding that the district court should have conducted a hearing under
Daubert and analyzed the evidence to determine whether the expert’s proffered testimony
reflected scientific knowledge, and whether the testimony was relevant and would have
aided the trier of fact).
181. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." (emphasis added)).
182. Smithers, 212 F.3d at 315.
183. See id. at 316 ("[A]ccepting the district court’s analysis that all jurors are aware of
their obligation to be skeptical would lead to absurd results: expert testimony on eyewitness
identification would never be admissible.").
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Second, the government argued that admittance of the testimony would
have invaded the jury’s province.184 The court conceded that it would be
inappropriate for an expert to testify as to what the witness did or did not
see.185 However, the court stated that the "proper solution would have been
to excise the inappropriate portion of the proffer rather than to exclude all
of the testimony" because the general testimony regarding the perception
and memory of eyewitnesses is "relevant and helpful to the jury."186 Third,
the court addressed the argument that the expert testimony should be
excluded under Federal Evidence Rule 403 because it would cause
"delay."187 The Smithers court first noted that "‘in reviewing a 403
balancing, the court must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to
the proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
prejudicial effect.’"188 After noting that "delay" under Federal Evidence
Rule 403 did not refer to the late submission of motions, the court further
stated that it found no evidence indicating that the government did not have
sufficient notice of the expert testimony.189 The Sixth Circuit stated that as
a general proposition it is not appropriate to exclude important eyewitness
identification testimony based on its "supposed tardiness."190 A defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to an effective defense should outweigh a discovery
sanction.191

184. Id. at 317 n.3. The court dismissed the dissent’s attempt to bolster this argument
by stating that cross-examination and jury instructions should be the tools to discredit
eyewitness testimony. Id at 316. The court highlighted inconsistent procedural logic in this
argument for the dissent did not sufficiently explain "why cross-examination and jury
instructions can serve these goals for eyewitness testimony, but not for expert testimony."
Id. at 316.
185. Id. at 317 n.3.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 316 (noting that "‘delay’ [in Rule 403] does not connote delay in the
submission of motions or proffers; rather, it encompasses the prolonging of the length of the
trial, and can be read properly in conjunction with the other exclusionary factors: ‘waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence’").
188. Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984)).
189. See id. at 317 ("First, the Defendant filed his ten-page motion in limine requesting
a ruling on this issue a full month before trial . . . . Thus, it is impossible to say that either
the court or the government did not have adequate notice of the issue.").
190. Id.
191. See id. ("‘The defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an effective defense will
usually outweigh the interest served by pretrial discovery orders.’" (quoting United States v.
Collins, No. 87-5077, 1988 WL 4434, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 1988))).
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United States v. Downing192 is a seminal case out of the Third Circuit
that, at the time, marked a dramatic change in attitude towards eyewitness
expert testimony, and it is a case that continues to define the Progressive
Minority approach even today. In Downing, the sole evidence against the
defendant was eyewitness testimony and his sole defense was mistaken
identity.193 The Downing court conducted a Federal Evidence Rule 403
balancing test with regard to the eyewitness identification expert testimony.
The court conceded that it was possible for eyewitness expert testimony to
"mislead" or "confuse" the jury and noted that "[t]he danger that scientific
evidence will mislead the jury might be greater, for example, where the jury
is not presented with the data on which the expert relies, but must instead
accept the expert’s assertions as to the accuracy of his conclusions."194
However, the Third Circuit also emphasized the importance of eyewitness
identification expert testimony, especially where the eyewitness evidence is
the only evidence offered by the government.195 The court stated it would
be illogical to hold that the admission of the expert testimony would so
waste time or confuse the jury that it cannot be considered "even when its
putative effect is to vitiate the only (eyewitness) evidence offered by the
government."196 The court dismissed the fearful argument that these
eyewitness experts will be asked to testify in every case with an eyewitness
creating a "battle of the experts" problem which misleads the jury and
creates a prejudicial effect.197 The court stated that the district court has
discretion to limit the number of experts who can testify and the length of
their testimony.198 However, the court stated that if the eyewitness
testimony is highly probative, the parties are entitled to present the expert,
regardless of whether it adds to the length of the trial.199 "[P]resumably
such evidence will add clarity and enhance the truth-seeking function of the
trial, thereby offsetting the disadvantage of delay."200
192. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting "the
liberal standard of admissibility mandated by Rule 702").
193. Id. at 1244.
194. Id. at 1239.
195. See id. at 1243 ("The availability of Rule 403 is especially significant when there
is evidence of a defendant’s guilt other than eyewitness evidence, e.g., fingerprints, or other
physical evidence.").
196. Id. at 1243.
197. Id. at 1243 n.27.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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In summary, the Progressive Minority will normally not tolerate
exclusion of relevant eyewitness expert testimony under Federal Evidence
Rule 403. The Third and Sixth Circuits have begun to place limitations on
and provide restrictive guidance for when and how courts should use
Federal Evidence Rule 403 to exclude eyewitness identification expert
testimony. In the Sixth Circuit, an exclusion of eyewitness expert
testimony based on the idea that the expert testimony usurps the role of the
jury as fact-finder is an argument that is not accepted.201 The significant
steps taken by the Progressive Minority towards limiting judicial discretion
in the area of eyewitness expert testimony exclusion are very important. By
limiting judicial discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony under
Rule 403, these progressive circuits are beginning to treat Rule 403
exclusion as the "extreme remedy" it is intended to be.202 It is possible for a
court to abuse its discretion when conducting a Rule 403 balancing test, and
the Progressive Minority has begun to take a stand against the improper
exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony.
2. The Majority Approach and Rule 403
In direct contrast to the views of the Progressive Minority, many of the
circuits in the Majority Approach believe that eyewitness expert testimony
can often be excluded under Federal Evidence Rule 403 for causing undue
confusion, wasting time, usurping the role of the jury, or being unduly
prejudicial.203 These circuits stand firmly behind the claim that the
balancing of prejudice and probative value under Rule 403 rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court.204 Thus, under the Majority Approach, a
201. See, e.g., Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 480 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that
the exclusion of the eyewitness identification expert testimony was not proper and denied
the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense); United States v. Smithers,
212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that because of the existence of a dichotomy
between the inherent unreliability of eyewitnesses and jurors’ reliance on eyewitness
testimony, this is the exact situation where expert testimony is needed).
202. See supra Part III.A (describing the legislative history and purpose of Federal
Evidence Rule 403).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051–52 (7th Cir. 1992)
(affirming an exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony under Federal
Evidence Rule 403 as unduly confusing and prejudicial to the jury); United States v. Serna,
799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming an exclusion of eyewitness identification expert
testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[E]xclusion of
expert testimony is a matter committed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial
judge . . . ."); United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) ("The balancing of
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large amount of eyewitness identification expert testimony is excluded
under this seemingly impenetrable blanket of Federal Evidence Rule 403.
In United States v. Fosher,205 the government’s case rested almost
entirely on two eyewitnesses who purported to see the defendant in the area
of the crime at the time the bank robbery occurred.206 The trial court
excluded the testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403 because the court
feared the testimony would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice
and confusion because of its "aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness."207 The First Circuit affirmed this exclusion and added that
the trial court has the discretion to "avoid imposing upon the parties the
time and expense involved in a battle of experts."208
United States v. Serna209 is another example of an appellate court
deferring to the "broad grant of discretion" given to trial judges under Rule
403 and excluding the eyewitness expert testimony.210 The court concluded
that the proffered expert testimony would consist of nothing other than
"general pronouncements about the lack of reliability of eyewitness
identification" and noted that the expert knew nothing about the particular
factual circumstances surrounding this particular identification.211 Thus, in

prejudice and probative value under FED. R. EVID. 403 rests with the sound discretion of the
trial court.").
205. See Fosher, 590 F.2d at 383–84 (affirming the trial court’s exclusion of eyewitness
expert testimony as a decision that is within the lower court’s "sound discretion").
206. Id. at 382.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 383–84. Compare Fosher, 590 F.2d at 384 (stating that it is within the
court’s discretion to avoid a battle of the experts), with United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1243 n.27 (3d Cir. 1985) (dismissing the "battle of the experts" concern and stating
that highly probative expert testimony must be admitted regardless of the length it may add
to the trial).
209. See United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming an
exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403).
210. See id. at 850 ("A trial judge is accorded broad discretion in admitting or
excluding expert testimony under FED. R. EVID. 702 and in excluding testimony under FED.
R. EVID. 403 because of the danger of jury confusion or unfair prejudice.").
211. Id. at 850. Compare Serna, 799 F.2d at 850 (stating that a "general
pronouncements about the lack of reliability of eyewitness identification" are not enough and
specifically noting that the expert knew nothing about the specific circumstances of that
particular identification), with United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 317 n.3 (6th Cir.
2000) (stating that it would be inappropriate for an expert to testify as to what the witness
did or did not see and that general testimony regarding the perception and memory of
eyewitnesses is "relevant and helpful to the jury").
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the Second Circuit’s opinion, eyewitness identification expert testimony
would do nothing other than "muddy the waters."212
Recently, in United States v. White,213 the Fourth Circuit affirmed an
exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403
because portions of the testimony were likely to confuse the jury, while
other portions were within the common knowledge of the jury.214
Specifically, the court rejected testimony concerning the lack of correlation
between confidence and accuracy under Federal Evidence Rule 403
because it could not be quantified and thus would be more likely to confuse
the jury.215
The Eighth Circuit has noted that Federal Evidence Rules 702 and 403
provide for exclusion of "evidence which wastes time," such as "opinions
which would merely tell the jury what result to reach."216 The court noted
that because there is a "very real danger" that eyewitness identification
expert testimony could confuse the jury or "cause it to substitute the
expert’s credibility assessment for its own," it is often properly excluded
under Federal Evidence Rule 403.217
In summary, a majority of the circuit courts currently permit
eyewitness expert testimony to be excluded under Federal Evidence Rule
403. Most of the circuits have no pattern or clear guidance for when or how
Rule 403 should be used to exclude eyewitness expert testimony. Thus, we
are left with a plethora of contradictory holdings and a Majority Approach
without a solid stance on how Federal Evidence Rule 403 should be used.
The majority of circuits have placed no limitation on Rule 403 balancing
with regard to the admission or exclusion of eyewitness identification
expert testimony. As a result, exclusion under Rule 403 has been permitted
for undue confusion, waste of time, usurping the role of the jury, or for
212. Serna, 799 F.2d at 850.
213. See United States v. White, 309 F. App’x 772, 775 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming an
exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rules 702
and 403).
214. See id. (noting that mug shot recognition effect appears to be within the scope of
the jurors’ common knowledge).
215. See id. (noting additionally that the length of time the eyewitness was exposed to
the defendant negated the confidence accuracy correlation).
216. See United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) (affirming an
exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony).
217. See id. ("Given the powerful nature of expert testimony, coupled with its potential
to mislead the jury, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that the
proffered evidence would not assist the trier of fact and that it was likely to mislead the
jury.").
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being unduly prejudicial. The Majority Approach is in direct contrast with
the original purpose of Rule 403 as a remedy to be used only "sparingly."218
Eyewitness identification expert testimony should not be treated any
differently than other types of expert testimony. If the expert testimony
meets the requirements of Rule 702, it should be routinely admitted in all
but the most extreme circumstances. However, a majority of the federal
circuit courts are currently using Federal Evidence Rule 403 as a weapon to
block the admission of essential eyewitness identification expert testimony.
F. Circuit Split Summary
Currently, the Federal Circuit takes three distinct approaches regarding
the admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony. The majority
of circuits routinely exclude expert testimony on eyewitness
identification.219 The Third and the Sixth Circuits lead the Progressive
Minority and generally recognize the potential value in eyewitness
identification expert testimony.220 And last, the Eleventh Circuit continues
to stand its ground and holds that as a rule, eyewitness identification expert
testimony is inadmissible.221
Federal Evidence Rule 403 has detrimentally contributed to the
problem of eyewitness identification expert testimony exclusion in a
majority of the federal circuit courts today.222 The limited purpose of Rule
403 and its intended use as an "extreme" remedy have been abandoned.223
Even the circuits that have attempted to place some limitations on the
exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony continue to allow virtually
unfettered discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony under Federal
Evidence Rule 403.224 Given the limited appellate review and the lack of
218. See supra Part III.A (describing Rule 403 as an "extreme" remedy to be used only
"sparingly").
219. See supra Part IV.B (describing the "majority approach" of the federal circuits
with regard to eyewitness identification admissibility).
220. See supra Part IV.C (describing the Progressive Minority and the approach of the
Third and Sixth Circuits).
221. See supra Part IV.D (describing the per se inadmissibility approach of the
Eleventh Circuit).
222. See supra Part IV.E (analyzing how federal circuits treat exclusion of eyewitness
identification expert testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403).
223. Supra Part III.A.
224. See supra Part IV.E.1 (describing how the Progressive Minority still generally
allows a Rule 403 exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony).
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guidance for the lower courts on when they should admit or exclude
eyewitness expert testimony, a new solution is needed.
V. Potential Solutions and Recommendation
Eyewitness identification expert testimony is the only effective means
of educating the jury about the inherent reliability problems with
eyewitness identifications.225 Numerous studies have found that crossexamination and jury instructions are inadequate alternatives to eyewitness
identification expert testimony.226 Cross-examination does not effectively
increase juror awareness of the reliability problems intrinsic in eyewitness
testimony.227 Similarly, jury instructions do not sufficiently increase juror
sensitivity to the memory and perception issues of eyewitness testimony,
and in fact, have a tendency to confuse the jury and make them less
receptive to potential reliability issues.228 Eyewitness expert testimony
should be routinely admitted whenever an eyewitness takes the stand. To
achieve this, a solution which aims to combat the problem of eyewitness
identification expert testimony exclusion under Federal Evidence Rule 403
is needed. Thus, this Note now analyzes the potential parameters which
could be placed on the admission of expert testimony in this area and the
respective value of each alternative.
A. Judicial Solution: Global Adoption of the Progressive
Minority Approach
The first potential solution is a global adoption by all the circuit courts
of the Progressive Minority’s approach to eyewitness identification expert
testimony. The Progressive Minority recognizes the importance of
eyewitness identification expert testimony and as a general rule tends to

225. See, e.g., Harmon M. Hosch et al., Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding
Eyewitness Accuracy on Jury Decisions, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 294 (1980)
(concluding that numerous studies conducted on the impact of eyewitness expert testimony
on juries have revealed that the presentation of expert testimony significantly influences the
jurors’ beliefs about memory accuracy).
226. See supra Part II.C (describing cross-examination and jury instructions as
unacceptable alternatives to eyewitness identification expert testimony).
227. Id.
228. Id.
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favor admission.229 In particular, this approach has held that eyewitness
expert testimony should be "presumptively admissible" when the state’s
case is based primarily on eyewitness testimony.230 In terms of Federal
Evidence Rule 403, the Downing court gave specific guidance as to how the
balancing test should be conducted with regard to eyewitness identification
expert testimony.231 The Progressive Minority emphasized the importance
of eyewitness identification expert testimony in enhancing the "truthseeking function of the trial," especially where eyewitness evidence is the
only evidence proffered by the government.232 Specifically, "usurping the
role of the jury" and avoiding a "battle of the experts" have been declared
unacceptable reasons for a Rule 403 exclusion.233 The Progressive
Minority also discourages exclusion under Federal Evidence Rule 403 for
"confusion" or "delay" where eyewitness identification is the only
evidence.234
This solution is a significant improvement on the Majority Approach’s
general distaste for eyewitness identification expert testimony admissibility
and blanket deference to Rule 403 exclusions. One of the main strengths in
the Progressive Minority’s approach is that it has begun to address the
multiple avenues for eyewitness expert testimony exclusion. Not only have
the circuits declared their general acceptance of the scientific validity and
importance of eyewitness expert testimony under Rule 702, but they have
also begun to place limitations on the Rule 403 exclusion avenue.
However, this approach still has problems. Although the Downing court
noted the potential value in eyewitness expert testimony, it also specifically
stated that in certain situations exclusion under Rule 403 is still possible if
the probative value is outweighed by other dangers.235 Additionally, expert
229. See supra Part IV.C (describing the "progressive minority" and the approach of the
Third and Sixth Circuits).
230. United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 313 (6th Cir. 2000).
231. See Smithers, 212 F.3d at 313 (noting the importance of expert testimony on
eyewitness reliability, particularly when the state’s case is based primarily on eyewitness
testimony); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting "the
liberal standard of admissibility mandated by Rule 702").
232. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1243 ("The availability of Rule 403 is especially significant
when there is evidence of a defendant’s guilt other than eyewitness evidence, e.g.,
fingerprints, or other physical evidence.").
233. Id. at 1243 n.27.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1239 ("The danger that scientific evidence will mislead the jury might be
greater, for example, where the jury is not presented with the data on which the expert relies,
but must instead accept the expert’s assertions as to the accuracy of his conclusions.").
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testimony is only presumptively admissible when eyewitness testimony is
the main thrust of the government’s case. This passive approach still grants
trial judges a tremendous amount of discretion if there is any corroborating
evidence in the facts of their case to determine whether they feel admission
is appropriate. The appellate courts will continue to find a potential abuse
of discretion under Federal Evidence Rule 403 only if the trial court
excluded expert testimony when the government’s proffered evidence is
solely eyewitness testimony. The Progressive Minority has begun to affect
change at the appellate level, but the discretion granted at the trial level is a
significant impediment to the potential for any real and uniform change. A
much stronger solution is needed in order to attempt true reform in the area
of eyewitness identification expert testimony admissibility.
B. Legislative Solution: Specialized Relevance Rule
A specialized relevance rule reflects Congress’s judgment that, as a
matter of law, the evidence it governs fails a Federal Evidence Rule 403
balancing test.236 As discussed earlier in this Note, specialized relevance
rules are congressional proclamations that public policy concerns warrant a
limit to judicial discretion under Rule 403 for a narrow category of
evidence.237 A solution is to take the idea of creating a rule limiting judicial
discretion under Rule 403 and apply it to the eyewitness identification
expert testimony situation. The current specialized relevance rules
proclaim that in certain situations the evidence fails a Rule 403 balancing
test. An effective specialized relevance rule in the eyewitness identification
context would invert this model and state that in most situations eyewitness
identification expert testimony succeeds a 403 balancing test. To
demonstrate the idea, I have drafted an example:
Federal Evidence Rule ***
Expert testimony proffered to highlight the inherent reliability
issues present in eyewitness identification is NOT, in any
criminal proceeding, to be excluded under Federal Evidence Rule
403 as:
Unduly prejudicial;
Confusing; or
236. See supra Part III.C (describing the specialized relevance rules and how they
interact with Rule 403).
237. Id.
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Misleading.
However, such expert testimony may be excluded under Rule 403
in limited circumstances for undue delay or waste of time when,
due to testimony from multiple experts, the proffered testimony
becomes cumulative or needless.

The above rule would remove the discretion currently granted to trial
judges to determine that eyewitness identification expert testimony is
"unduly prejudicial," "confusing," or "misleading."238
This is a strong solution that would have the immediate and resolute
effect of limiting judicial discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony
under Federal Evidence Rule 403. Erroneous eyewitness identification has
had a negative effect on both perceived and actual procedural justice in the
federal courts. Public policy calls for this necessary legislative action. This
specialized relevance rule should not be seen as drastic because it is not
ratifying extreme change or permitting a result which would have
previously been disallowed under Rule 403. In fact the proposed rule is
merely enacting the result that should be reached under a proper Rule 403
balancing test. The scientific validity of eyewitness expert testimony and
the social science revealing the fallibility of eyewitness testimony is
virtually universally accepted.239 Additionally, studies demonstrate that
eyewitness expert testimony is the only effective mechanism by which to
inform the jury of these findings. Thus, there is no need for eyewitness
expert testimony to ever be excluded under Rule 403 for undue prejudice,
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury. Additionally, if multiple
eyewitness experts testify, the proposed specialized relevance rule would
continue to allow judges to exclude expert testimony that becomes needless
or cumulative and merely wastes time. This proposed rule is necessary not
because Rule 403 is flawed, but because the federal courts habitually
condone eyewitness expert testimony exclusions justified under flawed
balancing analyses.
An argument can be made that this legislative solution is merely a
small reform in the area of Federal Evidence Rule 403 and will not
significantly affect eyewitness expert testimony admissibility under Rule
702 and Daubert. Though Rule 403 is a significant part of the exclusion
problem, most eyewitness expert testimony is also excluded under Rule 702
and similar "cocktail rulings."240 Courts will still be free to hold that
238.
239.
240.

FED. R. EVID. 403.
See supra Part II (describing the social science behind eyewitness identifications).
See supra Part III.B (describing "cocktail rulings" as rulings that combine
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eyewitness expert testimony is within the common knowledge of the jury
and therefore it does not "assist the trier of fact."241 Though there is truth in
this argument, I do not believe it outweighs the potential value in the
proposed rule. The Progressive Minority has already planted the seeds of
change and recognizes the importance of eyewitness expert testimony under
Rule 702.242 Additionally, even the Majority Approach has conceded that
in narrow circumstances where the government’s case rests solely on
eyewitness testimony the admission of expert testimony may be
necessary.243 The proposed specialized relevance rule will not only limit
judicial discretion to exclude eyewitness testimony under Rule 403, but it
also has the potential to create a powerful ripple effect that will push the
majority of circuits to adopt the Progressive Minority approach. The
proposed specialized relevance rule is not just a necessary limitation to
judicial discretion, it is a congressional proclamation that eyewitness expert
testimony has value and that a significant problem existed that warranted
legislative action.
C. Recommendation
I recommend that Congress adopt a specialized relevance rule
addressing eyewitness identification expert testimony exclusion under
Federal Evidence Rule 403 such as the one proffered in the previous
section.244 This is the superior solution for a variety of reasons. First, it
combats the problem of the virtually unfettered discretion currently granted
to trial judges. Given that the majority of appellate courts are currently
unwilling to reverse an exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony, except in
the most egregious situations, this is a necessary solution.245 The social
science in this area has grown exponentially in recent years, revealing
conclusively that erroneous eyewitness identification is the most common

exclusions under Rule 403, 702 and other evidence rules).
241. FED. R. EVID. 702; see supra Part IV.B (describing circuits that have held expert
testimony is common knowledge and does not assist the jury).
242. Supra Part IV.C.
243. Supra Part IV.B.
244. See supra Part V.B (proposing a legislative solution and drafting a new specialized
relevance rule).
245. See supra Part IV.B (describing "the majority approach" and noting that most
federal circuits take a "discretionary approach" and almost always defer to the district court’s
decision on whether to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification).
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reason for innocent people being convicted.246 It is no longer acceptable to
allow judges to make policy determinations based on whether they
personally believe this type of expert testimony is valuable. A specialized
relevance rule will begin to combat judicial discretion at the ground level.
The Progressive Minority approach, while recognizing the importance of
eyewitness expert testimony, does not guarantee its admission and still
allows for exclusion in the federal district courts. A specialized relevance
rule, in contrast, will create immediate uniformity in the lower courts with
respect to the exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony under Federal
Evidence Rule 403. A solution which enacts reform from the ground up is
a stronger and more powerful way to affect change.
Second, this solution continues to allow for the relevancy of
eyewitness expert testimony as it pertains to the facts of each particular case
to be examined under Federal Evidence Rule 702 and the Daubert two-step
analysis.247 Thus, under Rule 702 it is still possible to limit the scope of the
eyewitness expert’s testimony as it relates to the facts of the case.248 For
example, in a case with a white defendant and a white eyewitness, Rule 702
could exclude expert testimony regarding cross-racial identification249
because it does not "assist the finder of fact."250 The proposed specialized
relevance rule is limited and defines the narrow situations where it is
appropriate or inappropriate to exclude eyewitness identification expert
testimony under Federal Evidence Rule 403. However, by keeping the
existing structure of Rule 702 and the Daubert standard intact, this solution
has retained a limited amount of discretion and flexibility to exclude or
246. See The Innocence Project, Fact Sheet on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.ph
p (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) (finding that "Eyewitness [m]isidentification [t]estimony was a
factor in 74 percent of post-conviction DNA exoneration cases in the U.S.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
247. See supra Part III.B (describing Federal Evidence Rule 702 and the Daubert
standard and their relationship to Federal Evidence Rule 403).
248. FED. R. EVID. 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.
249. See supra note 38 (describing the problems inherent in cross-racial
identifications).
250. FED. R. EVID. 702.
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narrow the scope of eyewitness expert testimony if it is not relevant to a
particular case.
Third, this solution is in accordance with the legislative history and
purpose of Federal Evidence Rule 403.251 Courts have almost uniformly
concluded that Congress intended exclusion under Rule 403 to be an
"exceptional, extraordinary remedy" to be used "sparingly."252 Rule 403
delineated a confined set of circumstances where exclusion would be
appropriate.253 The Federal Evidence Rule used language such as "undue"
and "substantially outweigh" to emphasize that generally the balancing test
should favor admission.254 Federal Evidence Rule 403 was never meant to
give a carte blanche of discretion to federal judges, especially where the
availability of alternative means of proof have been demonstrated to be
ineffective.255
And last, a specialized relevance rule, though limited to Rule 403, has
the potential to provide broader guidance to the federal circuit courts in that
it will be a congressional determination that eyewitness identification
expert testimony is valuable. Like many areas of reform in our country’s
past, often it is Congress who must take the first step and proclaim that the
time has come to acknowledge a problem exists and define the parameters
of a solution. After Congress takes the first step, the federal courts will
begin to feel more comfortable accepting eyewitness identification expert
testimony generally. The proposed specialized relevance rule has the
potential to lead the circuit courts that currently disfavor eyewitness expert
testimony admission to adopt the Progressive Minority approach. A
legislative determination that eyewitness identification expert testimony is
251. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the legislative history and purpose behind Rule
403).
252. See Imwinkelried, supra note 85, at 906 (noting Congress’ purpose in enacting
Rule 403 and arguing the rule should be interpreted narrowly so as not to improperly
resurrect the common law rules of evidence). "Congress intended that judges would invoke
this drastic remedy sparingly and infrequently." Id.; see also supra Part III.A (analyzing the
legislative history and purpose behind Federal Evidence Rule 403).
253. See supra Part III.A (noting that the legislative history of Rule 403 reveals the
language of the rule was drafted to limit judicial discretion by narrowing exclusion to a
confined set of circumstances).
254. Supra Part III.A.
255. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee notes ("In reaching a decision whether
to exclude on the grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction. The availability of other
means of proof may also be an appropriate factor."); see also supra Part II.C (describing
cross-examination and jury instructions as ineffective alternatives to eyewitness expert
testimony).
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important can affect widespread change and shift the trend to one where
eyewitness expert testimony is presumptively admissible.
VI. Conclusion
An examination of the admissibility of eyewitness identification expert
testimony through the lens of Federal Evidence Rule 403 has revealed a
disturbing trend in the federal circuit courts to use this "extreme" remedy to
block a now well-established body of social science from our nation’s
courtrooms. The story of Julius Ruffin represents thousands of similar
cases which play out across our country every day.256 Mr. Ruffin was rare
and lucky in the sense that he had DNA in the system and was eventually
exonerated. This is not true of many defendants who are trapped by a web
of circumstantial evidence and a confident but mistaken eyewitness who
took the stand and said, "He is the one!"
Today, a majority of federal circuit courts continues to disfavor the
admission of eyewitness identification expert testimony.257 Given the years
of social science evidence emphasizing the reliability problems inherent in
eyewitness identifications and the statistics tracking the growing number of
exonerations based on erroneous eyewitness identifications, it is no longer
tolerable to accept this trend. The Progressive Minority has taken noble
steps towards reform and recognizes the general importance of eyewitness
expert testimony admissibility.258 However, this passive acceptance of
expert testimony at the appellate level is not enough to combat the problem
of excess judicial discretion and hostility towards eyewitness expert
testimony that has seeped deep into the federal district courts.259
This Note recommends a legislative solution that limits judicial
discretion to exclude eyewitness expert testimony under Rule 403.260 The
proposed specialized relevance rule will prohibit unnecessary and erroneous
exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony under Rule 403. However, this
solution has the power to ignite a change that will extend much further than
256. See supra note 2 (describing the wrongful conviction and exoneration of Julius
Ruffin).
257. See supra Part IV.B (describing the majority approach towards eyewitness expert
testimony admission in the federal circuit courts).
258. See supra Part IV.C (describing the Progressive Minority approach).
259. See supra Part V.A (describing the strengths of the Progressive Minority’s
approach but noting that weaknesses still remain).
260. See supra Part V.B–C (describing and recommending a new specialized relevance
rule).
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eyewitness expert testimony exclusion under Rule 403. This legislative
proclamation valuing eyewitness expert testimony will send a message to
the federal circuit courts that the Progressive Minority is on the right track.
This proposed legislative solution is an attempt to begin to solve a problem
that has eroded and polluted our justice system for years. A specialized
relevance rule limiting the discretion of federal district court judges to
exclude eyewitness expert testimony is a foundational repair that has the
strength to support and ignite a universal trend of routine eyewitness expert
testimony admissibility.

